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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1902 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY HADAWAY, 
a/k/a VINCENT LAMONT JONES 
a/k/a LAMONT JONES, 
        Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00161-001 
(Honorable J. Curtis Joyner) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 16, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Anthony Hadaway was tried and convicted in federal court for interference of 
interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). He was sentenced to 293 months’ 
imprisonment. He raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends the court abused its 
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discretion in denying his pretrial motion to sever his charges. Second, he argues the court 
erred in allowing the government to introduce fingerprint reports assembled by the 
Philadelphia Police Department, because these reports contained prejudicial hearsay and 
their entry into evidence violated his rights under Confrontation Clause. We will affirm. 
          I. 
In August 2008, Hadaway committed two robberies at commercial establishments 
in Southwest Philadelphia. First, on August 1, he entered Fashion Unlimited, a clothing 
store located at 6127 Woodland Avenue, and pretended to shop for goods. He left without 
buying anything, and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Hadaway asked the 
shopkeeper to fetch him two pieces of merchandise from a wall display. When she did so, 
Hadaway beat and seriously wounded her, leaving her unconscious. He stole a gold 
necklace from the shopkeeper’s neck, moved the cash register to the back of the store, 
and stole $600 to $800 from the register. He then fled.  
Next, on August 6, 2008, Hadaway entered E-Z Cleaners, a drycleaners located at 
701 S. 52nd Street. He dropped off two items, was handed a receipt, and departed. 
Approximately thirty minutes later, Hadaway returned to E-Z Cleaners and told M.N., the 
sole owner and employee, that he wanted to retrieve his clothing because the fee was too 
high. He handed over the receipt, which M.N. put in the trashcan. Hadaway took out a 
handgun, pointed it at M.N., and climbed over the counter. He stole $100-130 from the 
register, and took $30, a debit and credit card, and two cell phones from M.N. Hadaway 
forced M.N. to the back of the store at knife-point, tied her up, and fled.  
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On the day each robbery was committed, Philadelphia police officers investigated 
the scene promptly. At Fashion Unlimited, they found a latent fingerprint on the cash 
register. At E-Z Cleaners, they found a fingerprint on Hadaway’s receipt in the trashcan. 
Both fingerprints were analyzed, and each was found to match a set of known prints 
belonging to the defendant. Hadaway was arrested on August 13, 2008. At the police 
station, he waived his Miranda rights and confessed to both robberies. With respect to the 
robbery at Fashion Unlimited, Hadaway stated, “I went in there and robbed it.” With 
respect to E-Z Cleaners, Hadaway confessed, “I went in there and asked for the money. . . 
. I pointed a knife at her [the store employee]. . . . It was a steak knife.” He also admitted 
to “jump[ing] over” the counter, stealing money from the store, and taking two cell 
phones from the employee.  
On March 12, 2009, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a 
three-count indictment against Hadaway, charging him with two counts of interference of 
interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and one count of using and 
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Before trial, Hadaway 
filed a motion to sever under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. He argued that consolidating the 
robbery counts would cause him unfair prejudice, because it would lead the jury to 
believe he was more likely to be culpable given the presence of two similar crimes. The 
court denied Hadaway’s motion.  
Hadaway proceeded to trial. The government’s evidence against him consisted of 
testimony from employees at each store; testimony from the Philadelphia police officers 
who obtained latent fingerprints from the crime scenes; testimony from Clifford Parson, a 
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fingerprint technician for the Philadelphia Police Department; and testimony from the 
detective who heard Hadaway’s confession. The jury found Hadaway guilty of 
interference of interstate commerce by robbery, but not guilty of using a firearm during a 
crime of violence. As noted, the District Court sentenced him to 293 months’ 
imprisonment, as well as ordered three years’ supervised release.  
II.1
Hadaway’s claim is unavailing. A district court enjoys considerable latitude in 
deciding whether to sever offenses under Rule 14, with the touchstone being whether a 
“substantial potential for prejudice” will arise if the trials are consolidated. United States 
v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir. 1992). “Mere allegations of prejudice are not 
 
Hadaway contends the District Court erred in denying his motion to sever. We 
review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) provides for the joinder of two or more offenses in an 
indictment or information when they are “of the same or similar character, or are based 
on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common 
scheme or plan.” Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a), meanwhile, a “court may order separate 
trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice 
requires,” where joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.”  Hadaway concedes joinder 
of the three offenses was proper in the indictment, but contends the court should have 
exercised its discretion under Rule 14(a) to sever the offenses at trial.  
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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enough; and it is not sufficient simply to establish that severance would improve the 
defendant’s chance of acquittal.” United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 
1981).  In Hadaway’s case, the court reasonably concluded that a “substantial potential 
for prejudice” would not arise from a single trial. The jury could “reasonably be expected 
to compartmentalize the evidence” against Hadaway for each offense, given that he was 
being tried for two relatively simple robberies, one of which allegedly involved a gun. Id. 
at 400; United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 332 (3d Cir. 1970). We have upheld a 
jury’s ability to consider multiple charges in cases far more complex than that here. E.g. 
United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding severance was 
unnecessary in a case with 31 bank fraud charges). 
 The District Court properly instructed the jury to consider each offense 
separately, stating “[t]he number of offenses charged is not evidence of guilt and this 
should not influence your decision in any way.”  That the jury convicted Hadaway on 
Counts One and Two (the two robbery counts) but not on Count Three (using a gun 
during a crime of violence) confirms it compartmentalized the evidence against him, and 
was not substantially prejudiced by the joinder of the offenses at trial. 
III. 
 Next, Hadaway contends the District Court erred in admitting evidence of two 
“Investigation Reports” produced by the Philadelphia Police Department, each 
concluding that a latent fingerprint found at one of the crime scenes matched the known 
prints of Hadaway. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 
758, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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 The Investigation Reports came into evidence under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), during the government’s redirect 
examination of its expert, Clifford Parson. On direct examination, Parson explained that, 
in his professional opinion, the latent fingerprints found at Fashion Unlimited and E-Z 
Cleaners matched those of Anthony Hadaway.2
 The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Investigation Reports into 
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).  Hadaway contends that while the reports might 
have qualified as business records, they contained a second layer of problematic 
testimony – namely, the statements of the two fingerprint technicians (besides Parson) 
 On cross-examination, the defense sought 
to impeach Parson’s credibility by pressing him to concede that, in conducting its 
analyses, the Philadelphia Police Department diverged from some of the professionally 
recommended standards for conducting “ACE-V” fingerprint identification. The defense 
also attacked Parson’s credibility by suggesting his analysis of one of the sets of prints 
suffered from “confirmation bias,” given that Parson was not the “initial evaluator” for 
that set. On redirect examination, the government responded to the defense’s attack on 
Parson by introducing the two Investigation Reports compiled by the Philadelphia Police 
Department, in which three technicians – an initial analyst and two verifiers – made 
positive identifications of each set of prints. The government’s objective was to show that 
the Department had complied with the widely followed standards for conducting ACE-V, 
and that Parson’s role in the process provided him a sufficiently informed expert opinion.   
                                                 
2 The only exhibits the government used during Parson’s direct examination were images 
of the latent prints found at each crime scene, and images of Hadaway’s fingerprints. 
Parson used the exhibits to demonstrate how he was able to make positive matches.  
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who made positive identifications in each report but did not testify at trial. According to 
Hadaway, this second layer of testimony was unsanctioned by Fed. R. Evid. 805 
(prescribing that “[h]earsay included within hearsay” is only admissible “if each part of 
the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule”), as well as by 
the Confrontation Clause, see Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (holding that 
a forensic analyst’s statements in a laboratory report were “testimonial,” and were 
inadmissible unless the analyst appeared at trial). On the Confrontation Clause point, 
Hadaway cites Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), where the Court 
recently held it did not satisfy Melendez-Diaz for a scientist to testify about a report 
compiled by his colleague, even if the two worked at the same lab. Nonetheless, 
Hadaway’s claims are unavailing. On redirect, the government responded to the defense’s 
assertions that the Philadelphia Police Department deviated from the protocols, and about 
whether Parson’s judgment suffered from confirmation bias, by introducing the 
Investigation Reports. The purpose of the reports was to respond to the defense’s attack – 
to show that the Department had performed ACE-V in a responsible and professional 
manner, and that Parson was an informed participant in that process with a well-founded 
expert judgment. Neither Fed. R. Evid. 805 nor the Confrontation Clause were triggered, 
because the reports were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein nor 
as “testimony” against Hadaway.  
 Furthermore, any error in admitting the reports was harmless. When a court errs in 
making an evidentiary ruling, we may affirm as long as there is a “high probability” it did 
not contribute to the verdict. United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 
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1996).  When that error is of constitutional proportions, we may affirm only if “it appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.” United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 459 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 78 (3d Cir. 
2008 ) (applying harmless error analysis to a Confrontation Clause challenge). Here, both 
standards – as to the evidentiary error, and as the Confrontation Clause error– are 
satisfied. First, at the time of the reports’ introduction, all of the potentially problematic 
testimony included therein had already been challenged by Hadaway. During the 
defense’s cross-examination of Parson, Hadaway’s counsel asked whether, and how 
many, persons at the Department besides Parson had positively matched the latent prints 
to Hadaway’s prints. Parson answered that, for each latent, two additional technicians 
made a positive identification. The only new information that came out during the 
government’s redirect and its introduction of the reports was the name of the two 
technicians. Second, the remaining evidence against Hadaway – from the testimony of 
the store employees, to the expert testimony of Clifford Parson on direct, to Hadaway’s 
confession – was more than sufficient to convict. These factors show it is clear “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent [any] error.” 
Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 460. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
